We report the case of a 39-year-old, temporal lobe epileptic male, MH. Prior to complex partial seizure, experienced up to three times a day, MH often experiences an aura experienced as a persistent sensation of déjà vu. Data-driven theories of déjà vu formation suggest that partial familiarity for the perceived stimulus is responsible for the sensation. Consequently, diverting attention away from this stimulus should cause the sensation to dissipate. MH, whose sensations of déjà vu persist long enough for him to shift his perceptual focus a number of times during the experience, spontaneously reports that these shifts make no difference to the sensation experienced. This novel observation challenges data-driven theories of déjà vu formation which have been used to explain the occurrence of déjà vu in those with temporal lobe epilepsy and the general population. Clearly, in epilepsy, erratic neuronal firing is the likely contributor, and in this paper we postulate that such brain firing causes higher-order erroneous 'cognitive feelings'. We tentatively extend this account to the general population. Rather than being a reaction to familiar elements in perceptual stimuli, déjà vu is likely to be the result of a cognitive feeling borne of the erroneous activation of neural familiarity circuits such as the parahippocampal gyrus, persisting as long as this activation persists.
Introduction
The sensation of déjà vu has been defined as ''[a] clash between two simultaneous and opposing mental evaluations: an objective assessment of unfamiliarity juxtaposed with a subjective evaluation of familiarity" (Brown, 2004, p. 2) . The dissociative experience has been reported to occur more in individuals with certain neurological conditions, as an aura in temporal lobe epileptics (Cole & Zangwill, 1963) and as part of the pathology of a migraine (Sacks, 1970) , but is nevertheless experienced by most 'healthy' individuals (though estimates range from 30% to 100% of the population having experienced it at least once, Brown, 2004) .
Different theories of déjà vu formation abound. The authors believe that these theories can be broadly divided into two classifications: data-driven sensori-perceptual theories suggesting that the sensation of déjà vu arises from familiarity evoked by some element of the perceptual input, and higher-order theories suggesting that déjà vu results from an overarching cognitive feeling that is applied to, and not driven by, perceptual input. Of the data-driven accounts, example include Gestalt familiarity (Dashiell, 1937) , single-element familiarity (Leeds, 1944) and optical pathway delay theory (Osborn, 1884) . Linking all of these theories is the supposition that the sensation of familiarity underlying the déjà vu experience is incomplete but not erroneous. Gestalt theories relate this to the configuration of perceptual elements, such as the arrangements of objects in a room, while Sno and Linszen (1990) have taken this further by providing a detailed technological analogy for the way in which aspects of the perceptual experience are degraded in their holographic model. Single-element familiarity proposes that one item in the perceptual field drives the feeling of familiarity which extends to a vague familiarity for the entirety of the environment. Abstracted slightly further from the perceptual surroundings to the way in which these perceptions are communicated, dual pathway theories such as optical pathway delay have intuitive appeal and a high public awareness. Optical pathway delay theory postulates that neural signals from one sensory input arrive slightly after the signals from another, leading to the erroneous sensation of having experienced the neurally-replicated event before. Note that even folk psychology notions of déjà vu tend to be bottom-up, based on re-experiencing material from past lives, dreams or repetitious acts.
The alternative to such theories is that the sensation of déjà vu is higher-order, or driven by erroneous cognitive feelings usually used to successfully interpret cognitive processing. By our account, normal healthy cognitive feelings operate to raise to consciousness mental acts such as remembering, knowing, problem solving and temporary retrieval failure. Normally, cognitive processing is 
